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PARTIES IN THE COURT BELOW 
The caption of this case contains the names of all 
parties in the court below except that defendant R-West, Inc., was 
originally named as R-West Systems, Inc. 
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JURISDICTION 
Section 78-2a-3(2)(k) of the Utah Code gives this court 
jurisdiction over this appeal. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Issue; Did the trial court correctly conclude that, 
under section 38-3-2 of the Utah Code, West One's perfected 
security interest took priority over the plaintiff's lessor's lien? 
Standard of Review: The trial court's interpretation of 
a statute and grant of summary judgment present questions of law, 
which this court reviews for correctness. See, e.g. , Ward v. 
Richfield City, 798 P.2d 757, 759 (Utah 1990); Bonham v. Morgan, 
788 P.2d 497, 499 (Utah 1989). 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTE 
Interpretation of section 38-3-2 of the Utah Code is 
determinative of the issue presented for review. That section 
states: 
38-3-2. Priority of lessor's lien. 
The lien provided for in this chapter [i.e., a 
lessor's lien] shall be preferred to all other 
liens or claims except claims for taxes and 
liens of mechanics under Chapter 1 of this 
title, perfected security interests, and 
claims of employees for wages which are 
preferred by law; provided, that when a lessee 
shall be adjudicated a bankrupt, or shall make 
an assignment for the benefit of creditors, or 
when his property shall be put into the 
possession of a receiver, the lien herein 
provided for shall be limited to the rent for 
ninety days prior thereto. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case, Course of Proceedings and Disposition in 
the Court Below 
The plaintiff brought this action to foreclose its 
lessor's lien against certain personal property of the defendant 
lessees, Frederick Paul Ninow, Staci L. Ninow and R-West Systems, 
Inc. See Record ("R.") at 2-7, 52-57 & 163-70, Defendant West One 
filed an answer claiming a perfected security interest in the same 
property. R. at 114-17, 194-97. The case involves the relative 
priority of the plaintiff's and West One's claims to the property. 
The parties stipulated that the property could be sold 
and the proceeds placed in an escrow account pending the court's 
ruling on the relative priority of the parties' competing claims. 
R. at 342-45. The priority issue was decided by cross-motions for 
summary judgment. R. at 244-95 & 299-316.-1 The trial court ruled 
that West One's perfected security interest in the collateral had 
priority over the plaintiff's lessor's lien. R. at 351; 
Transcript, June 10, 1991 (R. at 400), at 10-11. The court entered 
its findings of fact and conclusions of law, granted West One's 
motion for summary judgment and denied the plaintiff's motion for 
partial summary judgment. R. at 352-62. 
1
 The plaintiff claims that the parties stipulated that the 
plaintiff's lessor's lien was prior to West One's security 
interest. Brief of Appellant at 7 (citing plaintiff's affidavit). 
West One only stipulated that the plaintiff's lien attached before 
West One's lien was perfected, not that it had priority over West 
One's lien. See Transcript, June 10, 1991 (R. at 400), at 1. 
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The plaintiff appealed, but the appeal was summarily 
dismissed for lack of appellate jurisdiction because no final order 
had ever been entered resolving the plaintiff's claims against one 
of the defendants, Commercial Factors. See R. at 414, 42 0-21. 
Following remittitur, the plaintiff obtained a default judgment 
against Commercial Factors, R. at 444-4 6, the earlier summary 
judgment was revised to make it a final order, R. at 442, and the 
plaintiff appealed a second time, R. at 447-49. 
B. Statement of Facts 
The WFPP Trust owned a commercial building in Salt Lake 
City, Utah. On July 2, 1988, the WFPP Trust, as lessor, entered 
into a lease with defendants Frederick Paul Ninow, Staci L. Ninow 
and R-West Systems, Inc., as lessees. The lease was for a period 
of five years and two months, beginning July 1, 1988, and ending 
August 31, 1993. R. at 172-82. 
Before August 4, 1988, the lessees moved certain 
equipment onto the premises, including certain laminating equipment 
that is at issue on this appeal. See R. at 327. 
UCC-1 financing statements covering the laminating 
equipment and naming West One or its predecessors in interest as 
the secured party were duly filed on August 4, 1988; November 8, 
1988; February 3, 1989; February 9, 1989; and October 27, 1989. 
See R. at 255-95. 
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The lessees failed to pay the rent due under the lease. 
On January 24, 1990, the lessees abandoned the leased premises, and 
the plaintiff repossessed them. R. at 327. 
On February 2, 1990, the plaintiff, as trustee of the 
WFPP Trust,2 brought this action seeking, among other things, a 
writ of attachment against the equipment located on the leased 
premises. R. at 2-7. West One successfully defended the action on 
the grounds that its perfected security interest in the laminating 
equipment had priority over the plaintiff's lessor's lien under 
section 38-3-2 of the Utah Code. See R. at 194-235, 352-62. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Utah's statute governing lessors' liens says that such 
liens are preferred to all other liens or claims except certain 
enumerated claims, including "perfected security interests." Utah 
Code Ann. § 38-3-2 (1988). The plaintiff had a lessor's lien and 
West One had a perfected security interest in the same property. 
Under the plain language of the statute, West One's perfected 
security interest had priority over the plaintiff's lessor's lien. 
(Point I.A.) 
None of the plaintiff's arguments justify a departure 
from the plain language of the statute. Utah case law does not 
support the plaintiff's interpretation of the statute. (Point 
I.B.) Neither does the history of lessors' liens or the common 
2
 For convenience, West One will refer to both the 
plaintiff and the WFPP Trust as the "plaintiff." 
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law. (Point I.e.) The plaintiff's policy arguments are similarly 
unavailing. In fact, public policy supports the trial court's 
interpretation of the statute. (Point I.D.) 
Recognizing the weakness of his statutory arguments, the 
plaintiff now argues, for the first time on appeal, that the 
statute does not apply. The court should not reach the merits of 
this argument, but even if the plaintiff were correct that the 
statute does not apply (and there is no evidence of record to 
support this assertion), the only basis for the plaintiff's claim 
would be the common law, and there is no common law lessor's lien. 
Thus, if the plaintiff were correct that the statute does not 
aPPlY/ the plaintiff would have no claim to the property or its 
proceeds. (Point II.) 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
The Bank's Perfected Security Interest Is Superior to 
the Plaintiff's Lessor's Lien. 
A. The Plain Language of Section 38-3-2 Gives the Bank's Interest 
Priority. 
A landlord had no lien against the property of his tenant 
at common law. See, e.g. . United Cigar Stores Co. of Am. v. 
Florence Shop. 17 P.2d 871, 873 (Wash. 1933).3 Thus, absent a 
3
 Some jurisdictions recognized a common law remedy of 
distress for rent in arrears, under which the landlord could seize 
any removable personal property found on the leased premises. "The 
right to distrain is not a strict lien, but rather is a peculiar 
right which is in the nature of a lien, until the goods are 
actually distrained under a landlord's warrant." 49 Am. Jur. 2d 
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contract or statute granting such a lien, a landlord has no lien 
against the property of his tenant as security for rent.4 The 
lease in this case did not provide for a landlord's lien, R. at 
172-82, so the only basis for the plaintiff's claim to the 
laminating equipment or the proceeds from its sale is the Utah 
statute governing lessors' liens—title 38, chapter 3 of the Utah 
Code. 
Section 38-3-1 of the Utah Code provides for a limited 
lessor's lien: "Except as hereinafter provided, lessors shall have 
a lien for rent due upon all nonexempt property of the lessee 
brought or kept upon the leased premises so long as the lessee 
shall occupy said premises and for thirty days thereafter." Utah 
Landlord and Tenant § 726 at 675 (1970). In many jurisdictions, 
the remedy has been expressly abolished by statute, and in others 
it is deemed impliedly abolished by statutes governing the general 
remedies for recovery of rent. Id. A few jurisdictions never 
recognized the remedy. Icl. It is not clear whether Utah ever 
recognized the remedy or whether enactment of Utah's lessors' lien 
statute impliedly abolished the remedy. In any event, absent a 
consensual lien, compliance with Utah's lessors' lien statute is 
now the only way a landlord can seize a tenant's property. 
Pentecost v. Harward, 699 P.2d 696, 699 (Utah 1985) (absent 
compliance with the statute, seizing a tenant's property is 
actionable as a tort); Fudge v. Downing, 83 Utah 101, 27 P.2d 33, 
37 (1933) (tenant could recover the value of personal property 
taken where the landlord failed to show that it acquired any lien 
on the personal property by statute or agreement). The plaintiff 
does not claim he has any interest in the property other than a 
lessor's lien. 
4
 The plaintiff conceded as much in the brief he filed on 
his first appeal. See Brief of Appellant at 12, Webb v. Ninow, 
(Utah) (No. 910318) (Utah Ct. App. No. 92052-CA) ("A landlord by 
virtue of his position has no lien upon any property of his tenant 
as security for rent, in the absence of contract or statute"). 
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Code Ann. § 38-3-1 (1988). See also Citizens Bank v. Elks Bldq., 
N.V. , 663 P.2d 56, 58 (Utah 1983). A lessor can preserve his 
statutory lien by seeking a writ of attachment within thirty days 
after the lessee abandons the premises, in compliance with sections 
38-3-3 through -6. See Citizens Bank, 663 P.2d at 58. 
The same chapter that creates lessors' liens also 
establishes their priority: "The lien provided for in this chapter 
shall be preferred to all other liens or claims except claims for 
taxes and liens of mechanics under Chapter 1 of this title, 
perfected security interests, and claims of employees for wages 
which are preferred by law . . . ." Utah Code Ann. § 38-3-2 
(emphasis added). See also Gray v. Kappos, 90 Utah 300, 61 P.2d 
613, 615 (1936) (a lessor's lien is subordinate to the liens 
specified in the statute). 
It is undisputed that the plaintiff had a lessor's lien 
against the lessees' equipment under section 38-3-1. It is also 
undisputed that the plaintiff preserved his lessor's lien by 
seeking a writ of attachment within thirty days after the lessees 
abandoned the premises. But it is also undisputed that West One 
had a perfected security interest in the equipment as of August 4, 
1988, well before the plaintiff ever sought to foreclose his 
lessor's lien. Under the plain language of the statute, West One's 
perfected security interest takes priority over the plaintiff's 
lessor's lien. 
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The plaintiff argues, however, that, where a lessor 
properly preserves his lien by seeking a writ of attachment within 
the thirty-day period, the lien relates back to the start of the 
lease or, at the latest, to when the collateral was brought onto 
the premises and that the lessor's lien takes priority over 
security interests that were perfected after that date. Because 
the plaintiff preserved his lessor's lien by obtaining a writ of 
attachment within thirty days after the lessees quit the premises, 
he claims that his lien is superior to the bank's security 
interest, which was not perfected until after the plaintiff's 
lessor's lien attached. 
The only problem with the plaintiff's argument is that it 
is not what the statute says. 
It is a basic canon of statutory construction that, in 
interpreting a statute, the court must first look to the statute's 
plain language and must give effect to every part of the statute. 
See, e.g.. Consumer Prod. Safety Comm'n v. GTE Sylvania, Inc. 447 
U.S. 102, 108 (1980); Schurtz v. BMW of N. Am., Inc.. 814 P.2d 
1108, 1112 (Utah 1991); Totorica v. Thomas. 16 Utah 2d 175, 397 
P.2d 984, 987 (1965); 2A N. Singer, Statutes and Statutory 
Construction § 46.06 (Sands 4th ed. 1984). If the language of the 
statute is plain and unambiguous, it must be given effect. See. 
e.g. . Caminetti v. United States. 242 U.S. 470, 485 (1917); 
Brinkerhoff v. Forsvth. 779 P.2d 685, 686 (Utah 1989); N. Singer, 
supra. § 46.04. Exceptions not made in the statute generally 
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cannot be read into it. See, e.g., Andrus v. Glover Constr. Co., 
446 U.S. 608, 616-17 (1980). 
The language of the statute here is clear and 
unambiguous. It gives lessors' liens priority over all other liens 
and claims "except" certain enumerated claims, including "perfected 
security interests." Utah Code Ann. § 38-3-2. It does not say 
that the security interest must have been perfected before the 
lessor's lien attached. If that is what the legislature intended, 
it certainly could have said so, but it did not. Cf. Ala. Code § 
7-9-310(2) (giving a landlord's lien priority over security 
interests that attach after the property is brought onto the 
premises). 
The plaintiff would have the court rewrite the statute to 
read: "The lien provided for in this chapter shall be preferred to 
all other liens except . . . security interests perfected before 
the landlord's lien attaches . . . ." It is not the function of 
the court to rewrite or amend statutes, however. The court must 
apply the statute as it is written, and, under the plain language 
of the statute, West One's perfected security interest is preferred 
over the plaintiff's lien. The plaintiff's argument that a 
lessor's lien should be preferred to later perfected security 
interests is best addressed to the legislature. 
The plaintiff now suggests, for the first time on this 
appeal, that his lessor's lien is itself a "perfected security 
interest" within the meaning of the statute and that the priority 
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among the plaintiff's interest and West One's should therefore be 
determined solely on the basis of when each arose. See Brief of 
Appellant at 12. The plaintiff never made that argument below or 
in his original brief on appeal and cites no authority for his 
argument.5 The court should therefore not even consider the 
argument. See, e.g. . Katz v. Pierce. 732 P. 2d 92, 95-96 (Utah 
1986); State v. Amicone, 689 P.2d 1341, 1344 (Utah 1984); Richins 
v. Delbert Chipman & Sons Co. , 817 P.2d 382, 387 (Utah Ct. App. 
1991); English v. Standard Optical Co.. 814 P.2d 613, 618-19 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1991). 
The argument lacks merit in any event. The statute gives 
"perfected security interests" priority over lessors' liens. It 
would be tautologous to suggest that the term "perfected security 
interests" includes lessors' liens. If that were the case, then 
the statute would mean that lessors' liens have priority over 
lessors' liens. If the legislature had intended "perfected 
security interests" to include lessors' liens, either it would not 
5
 The cases generally distinguish between statutory 
lessors' liens and security interests, the perfection of which is 
governed by article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code. See, e.g., 
Darden v. Ogle. 310 So.2d 182, 184-85 (Ala. 1975); Universal C.I.T. 
Credit Corp. v. Congressional Motors. Inc.. 228 A.2d 463, 469-70 
(Md. 1967). See generally Annotation, Secured Transactions: 
Priority as Between Statutory Landlord's Lien and Security Interest 
Perfected in Accordance with Uniform Commercial Code. 99 A.L.R.3d 
1006 (1980). Compare Utah Code Ann. § 70A-9-102(1) (1990) (article 
9 of the Uniform Commercial Code is generally meant to apply to any 
transaction, regardless of form, that is meant to create a security 
interest in personal property or fixtures), with id. § 70A-9-104(b) 
(article 9 does not apply to a landlord's lien). 
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have subordinated lessors' liens to perfected security interests in 
the first place, or it would have referred to "other perfected 
security interests" or to "perfected security interests other than 
lessors' liens," and not simply to "perfected security interests," 
without limitation. 
Even if the plaintiff's lessor's lien were considered a 
"security interest," the trial court's ruling was still correct 
because the plaintiff's lien was not perfected until after West 
One's security interest. A lessor's statutory lien is not 
perfected until the lessor files a complaint and has a writ of 
attachment executed. Citizens Bank v. Elks Bldg., N.V.. 663 P.2d 
56, 58 (Utah 1983). It is undisputed that West One's security 
interest was perfected before the plaintiff ever filed his 
complaint or sought a writ of attachment. Thus, under the 
plaintiff's proposed first-in-time rule, West One's security 
interest would have priority over the plaintiff's lessor's lien 
even if that lien were considered a "perfected security interest." 
Cf. Utah Code Ann. § 70A-9-312(5)(a) (1990) (conflicting security 
interests in the same collateral rank according to priority in time 
of filing or perfection). West One's perfected security interest 
therefore has priority over the plaintiff's lessor's lien, even if 
that lien were properly considered a "perfected security interest." 
B* Utah Case Law Does Not Alter the Conclusion That the Bank's 
Interest Has Priority over the Plaintiff's Lessor's Lien. 
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Despite the plain language of the statute, the plaintiff 
suggests that Citizens Bank v. Elks Building, N.V., 663 P. 2d 56 
(Utah 1983), requires the court to recognize exceptions to the 
strict priority established by the statute.6 The landlord in 
Citizens Bank did not perfect its lessor's lien by filing an action 
for a writ of attachment within the thirty days provided for by the 
statute. The court, in dicta, stated that, if the lessor had 
timely sought a writ of attachment and executed on it, "its 
statutory lien would have been perfected, and it would have been 
prior to the Bank's security interest." 663 P. 2d at 58. This 
statement can only properly be understood in light of the facts in 
that case. 
The lease in that case ran from August 15, 1980, to 
February 14, 1981. The lessee failed to pay its rent in November 
1980, and on December 15, 1980, it closed its business, leaving 
certain equipment on the premises. Thereafter, in March 1981, the 
b
 The plaintiff claims that the trial court did not 
consider the Citizens Bank case, suggesting that, if it had, its 
decision may have been different. In fact, the trial court judge 
stated that she had reviewed the pleadings and the cases that the 
parties had cited, "particularly the Utah cases." Transcript, June 
10, 1991 (R. at 400), at 10 (a copy of which is included in the 
addendum to the Brief of Appellant). The plaintiff cited Citizens 
Bank in his memorandum in support of his motion for partial summary 
judgment. R. at 307. Thus, the trial court apparently considered 
the case. Counsel for the plaintiff may not have argued the case 
at the hearing on his motion, but that does not mean that the trial 
court did not consider it. If in fact the trial court did not 
consider the case, as the plaintiff claims, it was only because the 
plaintiff did not sufficiently bring it to the court's attention. 
The plaintiff cannot therefore claim that the trial court erred by 
not considering the case. 
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lessee applied for a loan from Citizens Bank. The loan was 
approved and disbursed on April 7, 1981, and the bank filed a 
financing statement on the same day to perfect a security interest 
in the lessee's equipment, including the equipment left on the 
leased premises. Two days later, the landlord filed a complaint 
against the lessee for unpaid lease payments, in which the landlord 
asserted a lessor's lien against the equipment. The trial court 
ruled that the bank's security interest had priority over the 
lessor's lien. The lessor appealed, contending that it had both a 
statutory lien and a contractual lien on the equipment and that 
both were prior to the bank's security interest. Id. at 57-58. 
On appeal, the court first considered the validity of the 
lessor's claimed liens. Because it found that the lessor did not 
have a valid lien, it did not reach the question of priorities. 
Id. at 58. In fact, the court's opinion does not even mention the 
priority statute—Utah Code Ann. § 38-3-2. Instead, the court 
first looked at section 38-3-1, which grants the lessor a lien but 
only for a limited period: "[B]y the express terms of the statute, 
the lessor's statutory lien terminates thirty-one days after the 
lessee has quit the premises." 663 P.2d at 58. Thus, the court 
concluded, the lessor's "statutory landlord's lien expired January 
16, 1981, and, barring a contractual lien, [the landlord] stood as 
an unsecured creditor after that date." Id.7 The court noted 
7
 The court also rejected the landlord's claim that it had 
a contractual lien on the property. 
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that a landlord can preserve his statutory lien by bringing an 
action within thirty days. Id. (citing Eason v. Wheelock, 101 Utah 
162, 120 P.2d 319 (1941)). The court then stated that, if the 
landlord had "file[d] a complaint against the lessee, request[ed] 
a writ of attachment, and execute[d] on the writ," "its statutory 
lien would have been perfected, and it would have been prior to the 
Bank's security interest." Id. (emphasis added). That is because, 
if the landlord had acted within the time required by the statute 
(that is, by January 16, 1981), it would have attached and executed 
on the property before the bank ever took its security interest. 
The bank did not have any interest in the property before April 7, 
1981, and the lessor's claim could have been fully satisfied by 
that time. 
The court did not say that, had the lessor acted timely, 
its lien would have been superior to or would have had priority 
over the bank's perfected security interest. Rather, the court 
said that the lessor's lien simply "would have been prior tof" that 
is, earlier in time than, the bank's security interest. See id. 
(emphasis added). In other words, the lessor would have had a lien 
before the bank did and could have foreclosed on its interest 
before the bank's interest ever arose. Thus, Citizens Bank does 
not justify an interpretation of the priority statute contrary to 
its plain language. 
The plaintiff also argues that Gray v. Kappos, 90 Utah 
300, 61 P.2d 613 (1936), stands for the rule that first in time 
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prevails. In fact, that case merely held that a purchase money 
mortgage given before a lease was entered into was superior to a 
lessor's lien, a proposition neither side disputes. Nevertheless, 
the case merits some discussion. 
In 1928 a bank loaned the Kapposes money to buy sheep and 
took a note and mortgage in return. In January 192 9 the Kapposes 
leased land from the plaintiff on which to graze their sheep. The 
bank subsequently loaned the Kapposes more money to buy more sheep. 
The Kapposes gave the bank new notes and mortgages, which the 
parties apparently intended as renewals of the prior notes and 
mortgages. After the sheep were sold, the plaintiff brought an 
action, claiming that his lessor's lien took priority over the 
interests of the bank and of the purchaser of the sheep. 
The court first quoted the priority statute in effect at 
the time, which was identical to current section 38-3-2 except that 
it referred to "mortgages for purchase money11 rather than 
"perfected security interests." See 61 P.2d at 614-15 (quoting 
Rev. Stat. Utah § 52-3-2 (1933); Comp. Laws Utah § 3777 (1917)). 
The court stated categorically: "Under this statute, if the 
mortgage foreclosed by the bank was for the purchase money for the 
sheep in question, then it has priority over the lien claimed by 
plaintiff." Id. at 615. The court concluded that the initial 
mortgage and its subsequent renewals were purchase money mortgages 
and thus had priority. 
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The lessor in Kappos next claimed that his lien should at 
least have priority over the mortgages on sheep bought after 
January 1929, since the sheep were brought onto the leased property 
before the mortgages were ever filed of record. The court rejected 
the argument. It reemphasized that the plaintiff's lien, "based 
entirely on the statute," was "subordinate to a purchase-money 
mortgage." Id. The court recognized that the failure to record a 
purchase money mortgage could estop the mortgagee from claiming 
benefits under the mortgage, but the plaintiff had not claimed that 
the bank was estopped. The court concluded, "The transactions 
being bona fide, and there being no fraud or estoppel claimed, the 
plaintiff's lien is subject to the purchase-money mortgage," as the 
statute provided. Id.8 
C. Neither History nor the Common Law Can Change the Plain 
Meaning of the Statute. 
8
 In dicta, the court also reasoned that the lessor could 
not obtain any greater rights in the sheep than the Kapposes had 
when the sheep were brought onto the property, and since the sheep 
were already subject to the bank's purchase-money mortgage, the 
lessor's lien "was likewise subject to that same mortgage." 61 
P.2d at 615. In other words, because the bank was first in time, 
the lessor's lien attached only to the already encumbered sheep. 
The court's reasoning on this point seems faulty. See, e.g., id. 
at 616 (Wolfe, J. , concurring). Under that reasoning, a lessor 
could never have priority over a prior claim, yet the statute gives 
lessors priority over all claims except those specifically 
enumerated. But even if the court were right that the bank's 
purchase money mortgage had priority because it was also first in 
time, that does not mean that the statute only gives a purchase 
money mortgage (or, as in this case, a perfected security interest) 
priority where it is first in time. The statute contains no such 
limitation. 
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The plaintiff argues that the principles governing 
priorities in common law distress actions should apply to statutory 
lessors' liens and give lessors' liens priority over competing 
security interests that are perfected after the lease commences and 
the collateral comes onto the premises. The argument is irrelevant 
since, whatever the situation may have been at common law or in 
other jurisdictions, the priority of the parties' claims in this 
case is governed by the statute, Utah Code Ann. § 38-3-2, and the 
statute gives perfected security interests priority over lessors' 
liens, regardless of when the security interest was perfected.9 
The plaintiff has not shown that any of the cases he has cited from 
other jurisdictions applied a statute identical to Utah's to reach 
the result the plaintiff argues for, and, in fact, to the extent 
those cases were decided on the basis of statutory interpretation, 
they apparently did not involve priority statutes like Utah's. 
See, e.g., Howard v. Calhoun, 21 So.2d 361 (Fla. 1945) (construing 
a statute giving a lessor a lien from the time property is brought 
onto the premises in light of the state constitutional homestead 
exemption). 
If Utah's priority statute were meant simply to codify 
the general rule of priority (namely, that the first to attach has 
priority) , there would have been no need for the statute, since 
9
 Moreover, the plaintiff has not even shown that Utah ever 
recognized a common law right on the part of a lessor to distrain 
his tenant's property. See supra note 3. 
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that would have been the result if the statute were silent as to 
priorities. Moreover, that is not what the statute says. The 
statute could have established priorities based on when a lien or 
other claim attached or was perfected. Cf. Ala. Code § 7-9-310(2) 
(establishing priorities between a landlord's lien and a security 
interest in collateral based on when the security interest attached 
in relation to the collateral being brought onto the premises). 
But it does not. It says that lessors' liens "shall be preferred 
to all other liens or claims," without regard for when they arose 
or when they were perfected, with certain exceptions, including 
"perfected security interests." Utah Code Ann. § 38-3-2. If 
perfected security interests had to be perfected before the 
lessor's lien attached to have priority over the lessor's lien, the 
same would have to be true of the other exceptions, also. The 
plaintiff does not claim that the other exceptions (i.e., tax 
liens, mechanic's liens and claims of employees for wages) must 
have attached or been perfected before the lessor's lien to have 
priority, and there is simply no evidence that the legislature 
intended to impose any priority requirement on any of the excepted 
liens. 
D. The Statute and the Trial Court's Ruling Are Supported by 
Sound Policy Considerations. 
Important policy considerations support the conclusion 
that perfected security interests have priority over lessors' 
liens, regardless of when they were perfected. In fact, a cursory 
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reading of the statute indicates that all the exceptions to the 
priority of lessors' liens (namely, tax liens, mechanics' liens, 
and preferred claims of employees for wages, as well as perfected 
security interests) represent policy choices by the legislature, 
that is, choices to prefer certain types of claimants to landlords 
when it comes to distributing a defaulting lessee's personal 
property, just as the legislature's initial choice to prefer 
lessor's liens over other liens (even when those liens were first 
in time) was based on policy considerations. The preference for 
lessors' liens encourages landlords to rent their property by 
giving them some assurance that they will get paid. The exception 
for perfected security interests, on the other hand, benefits both 
lessees and lessors by making it easier for lessees to borrow 
money, which may be essential to their ability to make money and 
thus pay their rent. It also encourages lenders to lend money, 
knowing that they will be secure even if the borrower later 
defaults on a lease obligation. If lessors had priority over all 
subsequently perfected security interests, commerce would be very 
difficult since lenders would be unwilling to lend money if they 
could not be assured, despite UCC searches, that their security 
interests would mean anything in the event of default. Even if the 
tenant were current in his rent at the time the lender perfected 
his security interest, a subsequent failure to pay rent could make 
the lender's perfected security interest worthless. Lenders could 
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not protect themselves and would not be willing to take that 
risk.10 Thus, the Utah Legislature had a rational basis for 
subordinating lessors' liens to perfected security interests. 
There may be other policy considerations favoring lessors, but the 
court "can only presume that the legislature weighed the competing 
considerations when it enacted [the statute] and can only suggest 
that complaints against inherent unfairness in the statutory scheme 
should be addressed to that body." Freund v. Utah Power & Light 
Co., 793 P.2d 362, 369 (Utah 1990). 
The plaintiff suggests that, even if the original 
priority statute represented a policy choice preferring lenders to 
landlords in certain situations (namely, in the case of purchase 
money mortgages), the 1977 amendment to the statute, which replaced 
the phrase "mortgages for purchase money" with "perfected security 
interests," was simply meant to bring the statute's terminology 
into line with the Uniform Commercial Code, which introduced the 
term "security interest" and did away with other types of liens, 
such as chattel mortgages, hypothecations, pledges, conditional 
sales, and the like, and was not meant to expand the scope of 
security interests that would take priority over lessors' liens. 
10
 The plaintiff suggests that a lender could protect itself 
by obtaining a landlord subordination agreement. Brief of 
Appellant at 9 n.12. But that presupposes a landlord willing to 
sign such an agreement, and not all landlords may be willing. The 
legislature could reasonably conclude that lenders should not have 
to bear the risk that a landlord may be unwilling to subordinate 
his lien voluntarily. 
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Brief of Appellant at 9 n.ll. The plaintiff cites no legislative 
history to support this argument, and it is not supported by the 
statutory language. If that were the legislature's intent, the 
legislature certainly could have said so. It could have simply 
replaced the term "mortgages" with "perfected security interests," 
without deleting the phrase "purchase money," or it could have 
replaced the whole phrase ("mortgages for purchase money") with the 
term "purchase money security interest," which is a defined term 
under the UCC. See Utah Code Ann. § 70A-9-107 (1990).21 Where, 
as here, the statutory language is plain and unambiguous, the court 
will not look beyond the language to divine some contrary 
legislative intent but can assume that the language the legislature 
chose accurately expresses its intent. See, e.g., Escondido Mut. 
Water Co. v. LaJolla Band of Mission Indians, 466 U.S. 765, 772 
(1984); Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder. 425 U.S. 185, 199-201 (1976); 
Allisen v. American Legion Post No. 134, 763 P.2d 806, 809 (Utah 
1988). The legislature chose to make lessors' liens subordinate to 
all "perfected security interest[s]," not just perfected purchase 
money security interests. 
The plaintiff also suggests that, if the statute is given 
its plain meaning, a landlord could be deprived of his lien through 
11
 The UCC treats purchase money security interests 
different from other security interests for some purposes. See, 
e.g. . Utah Code Ann. §§ 70A-9-301, -302, -312 & -313. If the 
legislature had intended to give only purchase money security 
interests priority over lessors' liens, it certainly knew how to 
make the distinction. 
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"sham transactions": "A lessee could borrow money, give a 
perfected security interest, and defeat a landlord lien." Brief of 
Appellant at 11. The plaintiff does not explain how such a 
transaction would be a "sham" if the lessee received consideration 
for the security interest he gave the lender, especially if he was 
current on his rent at the time, and the plaintiff concedes that 
there are remedies for sham or fraudulent transactions under the 
Uniform Commercial Code. Id. See also Utah Code Ann. §§ 25-6-1 
through -13 (1989 & Supp. 1991) (Utah Uniform Fraudulent Transfer 
Act) . 
II. 
Section 38-3-8 Does Not Alter the Priorities 
of the Parties' Respective Claims. 
Lastly, the plaintiff argues that chapter 3 of title 38, 
governing lessors' liens, does not apply in this case and that, 
under the common law, the plaintiff's lien has priority over the 
subsequent lien of the bank. 
The plaintiff raises this argument for the first time on 
appeal.12 Appellate courts will generally not even consider 
arguments raised for the first time on appeal. See, e.g., State v. 
Eldredqe, 773 P.2d 29, 34 (Utah), cert, denied, 493 U.S. 814 
12
 In fact, the plaintiff's position on this point is just 
the opposite of his position in the trial court. In the trial 
court, the plaintiff claimed, in his complaint, amended complaint 
and second amended complaint, that chapter 3 of title 38 did apply 
and that it gave the plaintiff a lessor's lien against the 
property. See R. at 4-5, 54-55 & 166-67. 
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(1989); Olson v. Park-Craicr-Olson, Inc.. 815 P.2d 1356, 1358 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1991). 
Moreover, section 38-3-8, the statute the plaintiff 
relies on for this argument, does not even apply under the facts of 
this case. That statute says: "This chapter shall not be 
applicable to a written lease for a term of years in which, as part 
of the consideration thereof, the lessee or assigns shall erect a 
building or improvements upon the leased premises." Utah Code Ann. 
§ 38-3-8 (emphasis added).13 All of the improvements required in 
the lease, on which the plaintiff relies, were to be completed by 
the lessor: "Lessor shall furnish and install concrete floor 
. . . ," R. at 180 § XVIII f 1 (emphasis added); "Lessor shall 
furnish and install commercial grade carpet and base . . . ," id. 
5 2 (emphasis added). The only obligation the lessee had was to 
pay half the cost to enlarge an existing door. Id. J 3. At best, 
the lessee only promised to help pay for an improvement. A promise 
to pay money is not the same as a promise to make improvements, 
and, under the statute, it is only the lessee's erection of the 
improvement, not even his promise to make it, that removes a case 
from the scope of chapter 3. In fact, there is no evidence in the 
record that the improvements the lessor agreed to make were ever 
13
 The apparent rationale for section 38-3-8 is that, where 
the lessee has made valuable improvements on the leased premises, 
the lessor receives the benefit of the improvements and therefore 
has less need for a lien on the lessee's personal property. 
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made. Thus, there is no basis for concluding that section 38-3-8 
even applies. 
But even assuming it does, the plaintiff has not thought 
through the consequences of his argument. He claims that, because 
chapter 3 does not apply, the common law does, and under the common 
law rule of priorities, his lien takes priority because it was the 
first to attach. The plaintiff forgets, though, that there is no 
common law lessor's lien. The plaintiff can claim a lessor's lien 
only because chapter 3 of title 38 creates such a lien. If chapter 
3 does not apply, as the plaintiff belatedly argues, then the 
plaintiff does not have any lien to take priority over West One's 
perfected security interest.14 Thus, section 38-3-8 does not help 
the plaintiff, even if it did apply. 
CONCLUSION 
The statute establishing the priority of lessors' liens 
means what it says. A lessor's lien does not take priority over a 
perfected security interest. The trial court correctly concluded 
14
 The plaintiff cites West One's argument in the trial 
court for the proposition that, if the statute does not apply, the 
common law does and that under the common law the first to attach 
prevails. Brief of Appellant at 15 n.14. Counsel for West One was 
simply referring to the issue of priorities. If the act creating 
lessors' liens did not establish any priorities, then the court 
could fill in the gap in the statute by applying the common law 
rule applicable to liens generally, namely, the first in time 
prevails. West One did not argue that, if there were no lessors' 
liens statute at all, the plaintiff would still have a lien on his 
tenants' property. See Transcript, June 10, 1991 (R. at 400), at 
3-4. 
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that West One's perfected security interest had priority over the 
plaintiff's lessor's lien. The judgment of the trial court should 
therefore be affirmed. 
DATED this %™ day of November, 1993. 
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PAUL M. SIMMONS, Esq. 
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FREDERICK PAUL NINOW; STACI L. ] 
NINOW; R-WEST, INC. , a corpora- ] 
tion, WEST ONE BANK, UTAH, a 
corporation; HOMER CUTRUBUS, 
NED F. PARSON; JIM HART; and J 
COMMERCIAL FACTORS OF SALT LAKE ; 
CITY, LTD., a limited partner-
chip, 
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1 FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
) CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
i Civil No. 900900672-PR 
i Hon. Anne M. Stirba 
This matter came before the Court, Honorable Anne M. 
Stirba presiding, on June 10, 1991, for hearing on cross-motions 
for summary judgment filed by defendant West One Bank, Utah and 
* 4 1991 
GpptfTc^Tr 
0035; 
plaintiff, William F. Webb. Defendant West One Bank was represented 
by Francis J. Carney, Esq.; plaintiff Webb by Robert F. Orton, 
Esq. The material facts were undisputed and, therefore, the Court 
makes the following: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. Defendant, R-West, Inc. is a Utah corporation and 
is also known as R-West Systems, Inc. 
2. On July 2, 1988, William F. Webb, as trustee of 
the WFPP Trust ("Webb"), as lessor, entered into a written lease 
agreement with defendants Frederick Ninow, Staci Ninow and R-West 
Systems, Inc. ("R-West"), as lessees, for the lease of certain 
commercial premises located at 2560 West Directors Row, Salt Lake 
City, Utah. The term of the lease was from July 1, 1988 to August 
31, 1993. 
3. On August 4, 1988, a UCC-1 Financing Statement was 
duly filed by Mr. Homer Cutrubus, Mr. Ned Parsons, and Mr. Jim 
Hart, as secured parties, as to personal property collateral con-
sisting of certain foam lamination equipment and related material, 
all owned by R-West, Inc. (the "Collateral"). 
4. The Collateral was brought onto the leased premise 
Bometime after July 2, 1988 and before August 4, 1988, by R-West, 
Inc. 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law - 2 
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5. The Collateral remained on the leased premises con-
tinuously from before August 4, 1988, until after the commencement 
of this action in February 1990. 
6. On November 8, 1988, a second UCC-1 Financing State-
ment on the Collateral was filed in favor of Continental Bank & 
Trust Company (the former name of West One Bank, Utah). 
7. A third UCC-1 Financing Statement in favor of Con-
tinental Bank & Trust Company on the Collateral was filed on Feb-
ruary 3, 1989. 
8. A fourth UCC-1 Financing Statement in favor of Con-
tinental Bank & Trust Company on the Collateral was filed as a 
fixture filing with the Salt Lake County Clerk' s Office on February 
9, 1989. 
9. A fifth UCC-1 Financing Statement on the Collateral 
in favor of Homer Cutrubus, Ned Parsons and Jim Hart was filed 
on July 5, 1989. 
10. A sixth and final UCC-1 Financing Statement in favor 
of Commercial Factors of Salt Lake City, Ltd. was filed on the 
Collateral on October 27, 1989, 
11. On July 27, 1990/ the August 4, 1988 Security Agree-
ment of Homer Cutrubus, Ned Parsons, and Jim Hart on the Collateral 
was assigned to West One Bank, Utah and West One Bank has acceded 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law - 3 
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to all rights of Messrs. Cutrubus, Parsons and Hart in the 
Collateral. 
12. Defendant R-West breached the terms of its Lease 
Agreement with plaintiff and at the time of the commencement of 
this action there was due and owing the sum of $93, 850. 02 over 
and above all set-offs and counterclaims. 
13. The premises were abandoned by defendant R-West, 
Inc. on January 24, 1990/ after having been continuously occupied 
since the commencement of the lease, and plaintiff retook possession 
on that date. 
14. On February 9, 1990, plaintiff obtained a writ of 
attachment as against the Collateral and duly executed same. 
15. By stipulation of plaintiff Webb and defendant West 
One Bank the Collateral was sold for the sum of $150,000 which 
amount has been placed into an interest-bearing account with West 
One Bank. The parties have stipulated that the Court may determine 
priority in the cash proceeds in the same manner as priority in 
the Collateral itself would have been determined had it not been 
sold. 
DISCDSSTOK 
West One Bank has moved for summary judgment adjudging 
the relative priorities of the parties in the Collateral in accord-
ance with § 38-3-5, Utah Code Ann. (1977). Plaintiff Webb has filed 
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a cross-motion for summary judgment adjudging and decreeing that 
his lessor' s lien has priority over all other liens in the 
Collateral, including the bank's. West One Bank and Mr. Webb, by 
their respective counsel, have filed memoranda which have been 
reviewed by the Court. No appearances have been made by or on 
behalf of any other parties in this action. 
Section 38-3-5 provides that upon the filing of a com-
plaint for execution upon a lessor' s lien, it shall be the duty of 
the court to, among other things, "make a determination of the 
priorities of the claims, liens, and security interests in such 
property. M There are no material disputed facts and therefore 
the priority issues can be decided by summary judgment under Rule 
56, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. It is undisputed that plaintiff 
has a lessor's lien pursuant to § 38-3-1 in the Collateral. It 
is also undisputed that defendant West One Bank has duly-perfected 
security interests in the Collateral dating from August 4, 1988. 
Finally, it is undisputed that the Collateral was brought onto 
the leased premises before the perfection of the security interest 
by West One Bank' s predecessor-in-interest on August 4, 1988, 
Section 38-3-2 provides that a lessor's lien "shall be 
preferred to all other liens or claims except claims for taxes 
and liens of mechanics under Chapter 1 of this title, perfected 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law - 5 
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gecvrity uterestS/ and claims of employees for wages which are 
preferred by law . . ,« (emphasis added). Plaintiff did not dis-
pute that a perfected security interest in the Collateral would 
be prior to its lessor' s lien had that security interest been per-
fected before the Collateral was brought onto the leased premises. 
The issue before the Court was whether a security interest in Col-
lateral which was perfected after the Collateral had been brought 
onto the leased premises, and thus became subject to a lessor's 
lien, still had priority over the lessor' s lien under § 38-3-2. 
The Court, having reviewed the pertinent statutes and the 
memoranda submitted by counsel, having heard the arguments of coun-
sel, and being otherwise advised in the premises, finds that the 
statutory intent expressed in § 38-3-2 is to grant priority to 
perfected security interests over lessor's liens, even if those 
security interests are perfected after collateral is brought onto 
the leased premises. Therefore, the Court concludes as follows: 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. Plaintiff Webb has a valid lessor' s lien pursuant 
to § 38-3-1 which attached to the Collateral as of the date it 
was brought onto the leased premises. 
2. Defendant West One Bank has duly-perfected security 
interests in the Collateral which were first perfected on August 
4, 1988. 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law - 6 
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3. Under § 38-3-2, Utah Code Ann. (1977) the perfected 
security interests of West One Bank are prior to the lessor's lien 
of plaintiff Webb. 
.£*k MADE AND ENTERED thi£/ T' VV day of June, 1991. 
BY THE COURT: 
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Civil No. 900900672-PR 
Hon. Anne M. Stirba 
This matter came before the Court, Honorable Anne M. 
Stirba presiding, on June 10, 1991, for hearing on cross-motions 
for summary judgment filed by defendant West One Bank, Utah and 
plaintiff, William F. Webb, as Trustee of WFPP Trust. Defendant 
West One Bank was represented by Francis J, Carney, Esq. ; plaintiff 
Webb by Robert F. Orton, Esq. 
The Court, having reviewed the memoranda submitted by 
counsel, and having heard the arguments of counsel, having entered 
its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and being otherwise 
advised in the premises, hereby 
ORDERS, ADJUDGES AND DECREES that defendant West One 
Bank' s Motion for Summary Judgment shall be, and hereby is granted; 
that plaintiff William F. Webb' s Motion for Summary Judgment shall 
be, and hereby is, denied; that, accordingly, Summary Judgment is 
entered in favor of West One Bank, Utah as against William F. Webb, 
Trustee of WFPP Trust, decreeing that the perfected security in-
terests of West One Bank, Utah are prior to and superior to the 
lessor' s lien of plaintiff, William F. Webb, as Trustee of WFPP 
Trust. The parties shall bear their own costs and fees. 
Li^M^sa MADE AND ENTERED t h i V ^ t ^ N i a y fr£s*ffgft*w 1991. 
BY THE COUR? 
HONORABLE" ANN^H^ 
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